arbitrage. candy floss or cotton candy or spun sugar. dicing

But the question remains: just why doesn't Facebook want Tufekci's money? One reason, I think, is that it would expose the arbitrage scheme at the core of Facebook's business model and the ridiculous degree to which people undervalue their personal data.

arbitrage

ˈɑːbɪtrɪdʒ , ˌɑːbɪˈtrɑːʒ /

ECONOMICS

noun

1. 1 .

   the simultaneous buying and selling of securities, currency, or commodities in different markets or in derivati​​ve forms in order to take advantage of differing prices for the same asset.

   "profitable arbitrage opportunities"

verb

1. 1 .

   buy and sell assets using arbitrage.

   "much of the short selling was being done by people who were arbitraging between the bond and the equity market"  

別再製造金融“棉花糖”

Candy floss cloud of shadow banking needs to be untangled

作者：英國《金融時報》專欄作家吉蓮•邰蒂

字號

背景

收藏 電郵 打印 評論 中文

A couple of years ago, it occurred to me that the 21st century financial system had come to resemble a huge ball of candy floss (or cotton candy, as Americans might say). For bankers had become so adept at slicing and dicing debt instruments, and then re-using these in numerous deals, they had in effect spun a great web of leverage and trading activity – in much the same way that sugar is spun in a bowl to create candy floss.	幾年前，我突然意識到，21世紀的金融體系越來越像是一個巨大的棉花糖。銀行家在切割債務工具、隨後在眾多交易中對其重新加以使用上極其熟捻，事實上編織成了一張槓桿和交易行為的大網——和不停轉動機器製作棉花糖的方法頗為相似。
From a distance, that activity looked impressive. But the underlying asset base was surprisingly small. Thus the key question that has hung over the system – and is doubly relevant now – is whether that cloud of trading activity could crumble back into itself? And what might the impact of that be?	遠遠看去，這種行為令人驚嘆。但其基礎資產的規模卻小得驚人。因此，金融體系懸而未決的關鍵問題（如今這個問題具有雙重意義）是：這種大規模的交易活動會不會把自己撞個四分五裂？而這又可能造成什麼後果？
Now, a fascinating little paper has just emerged from the International Monetary Fund which sheds light on this. This article*, by Manmohan Singh and James Aitken, is not pitched at a mainstream audience; it focuses on the issue of “rehypothecation” and its link to shadow banking. But that is a pity.	國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)剛剛發表的一篇引人入勝的短文，闡述了這個問題。曼莫漢•辛格(Manmohan Singh)和詹姆斯•艾特肯(James Aitken)撰寫的這篇文章*，針對的並不是主流聽眾，而是以“再抵押(rehypothecation)”問題為焦點，並關注其與影子銀行業的關聯。但這令人遺憾。
For while the issue of rehypothecation might sound arcane, it is central to the financial system. The issue involves the collat​​eral that typically underpins trading and lending deals cut by banks with hedge funds and other banks. In recent decades, whenever a bank has made a loan to a hedge fund or cuts a deal with another bank, this is typically backed by collat​​eral, such as a mortgage-backed security or treasury bond.	因為，儘管再抵押問題或許聽上去晦澀難懂，但它是金融體系的核心所在。該問題所涉及的抵押品，通常是銀行與對沖基金及其它銀行達成的交易與借貸協議的基礎。最近數十年，每當一家銀行向對沖基金發放貸款，或與另一家銀行達成交易，通常都有抵押品作為擔保，例如抵押貸款支持證券(MBS)或國債。
In a sense this is similar to an ordinary mortgage loan: if a hedge fund fails to repay a loan, or honour a trade, a bank can seize that collat​​eral in much the same way that a bank might grab a house if a mortgage defaults. But what makes these complex financial trades different from, say, a mortgage loan is that banks tend constantly to revalue the collat​​eral, and adjust the deals to compensate.	某種意義上，這與普通的抵押貸款類似：如果對沖基金未能償還貸款，或履行交易，銀行就可以沒收該抵押品，就像房主拖欠抵押貸款後銀行收回房屋一樣。但這些複雜金融交易與抵押貸款的不同之處在於，銀行往往會不斷對抵押品重新估值，並調整協議內容，以彌補差額。
More important still, banks often churn, or “rehypothecate”, that collat​​eral. More specifically, when banks receive collat​​eral from hedge funds, they often act as if they owned that collat​​eral outright – and post that as collat​​eral to support their own deals. Thus one piece of collat​​eral can be churned several times to support several deals; hence that great financial candy floss cloud.	更重要的是，銀行常常會重複利用、或“再抵押”這些抵押品。說得更具體點，當銀行收到對沖基金提供的抵押品後，往往表現得好像自己完全擁有了它們那樣，並利用它們為自己的交易提供擔保。因此，一件抵押品可以被重複利用多次，作為多筆交易的擔保；由​​此產生了一團巨大的金融棉花糖。
Now, until 2007 regulators tended to pay remarkably little attention to this, and even now the issue of rehypothecation is apt to be ignored by investors and policymakers, partly because most of this activity is very opaque. However, there are two reasons why it would make sense to track it much more closely. First, the price at which banks value collat​​eral is a telling indication and early warning signal of how savvy financiers really feel about the risks in the system.	在2007年之前，監管機構對這種情況通常毫不在意。即使是現在，再抵押問題仍然容易被投資者和政策制定者所忽視，部分原因在於這些行為大多秘而不宣。然而，有兩個原因可以解釋為何我們必須對其進行更緊密的追踪。首先，銀行對抵押品的估價，提供了一個有力信號和早期預警，能夠顯示精明的金融家對於系統中風險的真實感受。
Second, as the IMF paper shows, this rehypothecation activity can be so frenetic it can significantly affect the overall volume of leverage in the system. The IMF paper calculates that, by 2007, the seven largest US brokers were getting about $4,500bn of funding from rehypothecation activity, most of which was not recorded in their accounts or the US government's flow of fund data.	其次，正如IMF論文所顯示的那樣，這種再抵押行為可能猖獗到嚴重影響系統內部槓桿總量的程度。根據IMF論文的估算，截至2007年，美國七大券商通過再抵押活動獲得了約4.5萬億美元的資金，其中大部分在它們的帳戶上或美國政府的資金流動數據中都沒有記錄。
Moreover, if you factor that activity into estimates of the size of the shadow banking world, this sector had swelled to about $10,000 in size in the US – double previous estimates. And, this had a fascinating cross-border dimension. In the UK, as the IMF notes, “an unlimited amount of customers' assets can be rehypothecated and there are now customer protection rules”. In the US accounts were segregated. Thus most funding has hitherto come from London.	除此之外，如果你在估算影子銀行體系規模時將這種行為考慮在內，美國的影子銀行規模就會擴大到10萬億美元——為先前估計的兩倍。而且，它還具有一種令人著迷的跨境維度。IMF指出，在英國，“可以被再抵押的客戶資產數量沒有限制，而現在已經制訂了客戶保護法”。在美國，客戶賬戶和銀行賬戶相互獨立，因此迄今為止大部分資金都來自倫敦。
Now, the “good” news, as it were, is that some of this candy floss cloud has now collapsed, because banks have become more risk-averse, and the collapse of Lehman Brothers alerted hedge funds to the risks of letting their collat​​eral be rehypothecated in this way. Thus the IMF calculates that US bank funding from rehypothecation is now “only” $2,000bn-odd – or less than half its former size. That decline has clearly been painful for the banks. However, it does mean that some of the necessary, post-bubble adjustment is now taking place.	眼下，在某種程度上可以說，“好”消息是這團棉花糖有些地方已經軟塌，因為銀行避險情緒增強，而且雷曼兄弟破產向對沖基金發出了警告，提醒他們注意任憑自己的抵押品以這種方式再抵押的風險。因此，根據IMF的計算，現在美國銀行通過再抵押獲取的​​資金“只有”2萬多億美元——還不到先前規模的一半。資金的減少顯然讓銀行十分痛苦。不過，這的確也意味著，後泡沫時期的一些必要調整正在進行之中。
But the bad news is that it is still unclear how much more adjustment will occur, or what its impact on bank behaviour will be. After all, much of this rehypothecation activity remains rather mysterious.	但壞消息是，我們仍不清楚還會進行多少調整、或者調整對銀行行為將產生何種影響。畢竟，這種再抵押行為大多仍相當隱秘。
Meanwhile, that odd discrepancy between UK and US law appears to remain in place, creating scope for future cross-border arbitrage. That might not matter now. But it could become important if risk appetite returns. Just one more reminder of why regulators will need to stay on their toes, particularly given the shortcomings of financial reform – and the propensity of the financial world to keep spinning those candy floss clouds.	與此同時，英國與美國法律中奇怪的差異似乎依然存在，為未來的跨境套利行為創造了空間。現在這或許還無關痛癢。但如果風險偏好恢復，就可能變得重要起來。這不過是再次提醒我們，為何監管機構必須保持警覺，特別是考慮到金融改革的缺陷——以及金融界讓棉花糖越轉越大的傾向。
* The (Sizeable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking system; Manmohan Singh and James Aitken, IMF July 2010.	*《再抵押在影子銀行體系中的（可觀）作用》(The (Sizeable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking system)，曼莫漢•辛格(Manmohan Singh)和詹姆斯•艾特肯(James Aitken) ，IMF 2010年7月
	譯者/管婧 candy floss or cotton candy n. A light, very sweet candy of threaded sugar, often tinted with food coloring and twirled onto a stick. Also called spun sugar . v. , diced , dic·ing , dic·es . v.intr. To play or gamble with dice. v.tr. To win or lose (money) by gambling with dice. To cut (food) into small cubes. To decorate with dicelike figures. [Pl. of DIE 2 .]